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The European Union (EU) of today is a scene of clashing options: those advocating
liberalizing migration policy on the one hand and those calling for stricter immi-
gration regulations by individual member states on the other. This clash frequently
happens indirectly and obliquely, substantiated by the otherwise understandable
argumentation of the need to protect a given state’s domestic interests. This article
examines the case of three Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) and
the shape of the current discourse on the need to reform today’s immigration policy.
The applied qualitative research method includes analysis of official statements made
by politicians and analysis of media content (TV, news papers) in the years 2005-2010.
The discourse reveals the direction of changes that might be expected in the form
of new immigration policy in the Nordic countries.
The French policy reform, Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the
Right to Exile (CESEDA), opens the door to educated immigrants, but requires the new -
comers to undertake every effort to assimilate into mainstream society. More over,
the code restricts the family reunification law considerably, tightens the law on mixed
marriages and naturalization, and —most controversially— excludes automatic lega l -
ization of the status of illegal immigrants’ children (Bolzman and Baucher 2006).1
This kind of change in immigration law, proposed in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy,
is no novelty, not only in France, but in most of the highly developed European coun -
tries. Migration policy reform has become one of the major subjects deliberated
in the first decade of the present century. Following the French example, other
European Union member states also embarked on modifying their migration poli-
cies. It appears that current migration policy spans two aspects: immigration pol-
icy (legal regulation of immigration streams) and immigrant policy (policy deter-
mining the management of ethnic and cultural diversity, directly linked to immi grant
groups, and their right to participate in the social, political, and economic life of
the receiving country). 
Legal regulation of immigration streams, from the point of view of the receiving
country’s interests, necessarily has to aspire to relatively conservative solutions. It
exercises control over the number of immigrants and their market usefulness. As
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the experience of modern Europe reveals, in some countries (e.g., France, Denmark,
Belgium, Germany, or Austria) restrictions to free access to the domestic market
have been introduced particularly for uneducated people or those with insufficient
vocational qualifications. Instruments servicing that selection are, among others,
the “reception and integration contracts.”2 Failure to comply with these contracts
may result in unpleasant consequences for the immigrant, including an “invitation to
leave the country of residence.” 
European countries unanimously agree on tightened border control along the
frontier between the EU and the rest of the world, but different approaches to inte-
grating foreigners have left every member state to develop its own strategy for im -
migrants’ integration.3 For some countries, effective integration policy consists of
granting foreigners applying for permanent residence civil rights in all areas; for
others, it boils down to selective access to social privileges, such as the right to
vote, to fully enter the economic sphere (e.g., the real estate market), or to obtain
citizenship.4 Thus, while some countries endorse immigrants’ fuller participation
in society, others limit their efforts to institutionalizing immigrants’ temporary res-
idence (Bolzman 2006).
The general perception of migration in a given country affects people’s atti-
tudes toward immigrants as well as toward those natives who choose to emigrate.
Immigrants may inspire in society both positive and negative emotions, which are
in turn modified by economic, political, and cultural circumstances. An addition-
al element that shapes pro or contra immigration attitudes is the concept of state
and nation as a mono- or multi-ethnic entity. The concept is understood in many
different ways within European culture and politics.  
French sociologist Dominique Schnapper presented a socio-linguistic look at
the phenomenon of immigration (1999, 18). To explore the true attitudes of Euro pean
societies toward immigrant populations, she examined the terms used to describe
them in the languages of different receiving countries. And so, according to Schnap -
per, the Germans speak of foreigners (Ausländer); the British speak of racial and eth-
nic minorities;5 the Dutch use the term cultural minorities (culturele minderhe-
den); the French talk of immigrants (immigrants), who, with the passage of time,
come to be called members of the nation and eventually citizens. This terminol-
ogy points to the various ways people from a different cultural area are perceived
by the indigenous population. The perception then affects the way social integration
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2 These “contracts” may include obligations like the ability to speak the language of the receiving
country, to know its history, culture, and sometimes even its Constitution.
3 One example of a joint institution set up by the EU is FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Ma n -
agement of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the Euro pean
Union, based in Warsaw.  
4 Switzerland, which remains outside the EU structures, but is a member of EFTA and is located in the
very center of Europe, exemplifies restrictive treatment of immigrants and their children. People who are
born there, spend their entire lives there, study, and work there are still refused Swiss citizenship.  
5 The term “immigration” appears increasingly frequently in British discourse, pointing to the region
of origin of the incoming population, for example, “Eastern Europeans.”
models are constructed, which adopt different paradigms in each of the European
countries. 
Society’s attitude to foreigners sometimes changes with the passage of time,
as it is conditioned by economic, political, and social factors. In France, for instance,
the fellow countryman/foreigner relationship is based primarily on the utilitarian
assumption that could be translated into the following simple, though painful words:
the only desirable immigrants are those who can respond to the current needs of the
labor market.
In Great Britain, the presence of immigrants is a manifestation of the legacy
of an extensive imperial past, and the culturally diverse society is a consequence of
the country’s opening to people from the former British colonies. This way of com -
 pensating for the previous exploitation of subject economies has always had both
its advocates as well as violent opponents, auguring the “end of Britain.”6 When
comparing Great Britain to other colonial empires, we can easily notice that the flow
of immigrants from former dominions has been greatest here. This can be accounted
for by the adoption of the multiculturalism policy as a natural consequence of those
migration processes. 
A different integration model is characteristic of the Federal Republic of Ger -
many, which uses the notion of the “German people” (Deutsches Volk), understood
as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic unity (Schnapper 1999, 18). This concept of na tio n -
al community leads to the acknowledgement that immigrants, who form cultur-
ally and ethnically different communities, do not constitute an organic part of the
nation and, in some cases, may even debilitate it. According to Rita Süssmuth, a
German sociologist and chair of the Independent Council of Experts on Mi gration
and Integration, “Since the beginning of the 1990s, it is generally believed in Germany
that the presence of foreigners leads to the loss of German identity” (Center for
International Relations in Warsaw 2004, 7). This is a popular opinion that can be
heard on the street, especially in the eastern Länder of the country.
The government’s 2007 Integration Plan provides for the im plementation by
2013 of a series of essential actions to enhance social cohesion through educa-
tion, generally accessible German language courses, sports —a very effective plat-
form for integration— and the media, which raise awareness of cultural and eth-
nic diversity and through stimulation of “civic involvement” attitudes in German
society (Die Bundesregierung 2007).
The Netherlands presents an entirely different model. The dissimilarity stems
from historical and social differences. As a former colonial superpower, the Nether -
lands initially elaborated a type of an “asymmetrical consensus” of a multicultural
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See D. Childs (2001, 149-150) and Hollowell (2003, 81-82). Presently this policy is supported by
Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party, which has two representatives in the European
Parliament. Griffin officially claims that the presence of immigrants is undesirable. (BBC Television
2009).
country, in which immigrants were, above all, offered work. According to Andre
Krouwel, a political scientist from the Free University of Amsterdam, in the years
of massive importation of labor (1960-1980), not only the authorities, but foreign
workers themselves, believed they would go back to their home countries once
their employment was terminated. This belief was reflected by a policy of “many
cultures,” which meant that immigrants were not included in the social mainstream
and foreigners were not stimulated to learn Dutch, explore the history, culture,
traditions, or anything else conducive to acculturation (Radio Free Europe 2004a).
More recently, Meindert Fennema, one of the leading experts on migration pro ces ses
and a professor at the same university, has concluded that the multi cultural policy
was abandoned too late, only in the early 1980s, when it was observed that it led to
“ethnicization” of social life, understood as the establishment of closed cultural en -
claves (Radio Free Europe 2004b). In order to stop the creation of ghettos detached
from one another and from mainstream society, it was necessary to introduce actions
based on a different way of thinking.
Thus, integration took the form of joint efforts, actively involving both parties:
the minority and the so-called “mainstream” one. This paradigm shift in the per-
ception of the integration process was also reflected by the fact that the Ministry
of Integration became part of the Ministry of Education instead of, as it had been
until 2008, the Ministry of Justice (Słojewska 2008). Currently, the idea that inte-
gration should be based on education and understanding prevails in the Dutch
model of a cohesive society.
Switzerland, which is not part of the European Union, has worked out an immi -
gration policy of accepting the newcomers without guaranteeing them full partic-
ipation in social, economic, or political life. Immigrants are perceived as part of the
work force and, as such, do not have the right to citizenship, even after a stay of many
years. They are employees, tax-payers, consumers, producers, and little more (Bol z -
man et al. 2004, 411-429; Mahnig and Wimmer 2003). It is difficult for them to
obtain a Swiss passport, even if they were born in the country and studied and
worked there. Referenda on the simplification of the naturalization procedure for
foreigners were rejected. Therefore, descendants of immigrants, even if they were
born in Switzerland and have never lived in any other country, continue to be for-
eigners.7 The broad autonomy of the Switzerland’s cantons, with its long history,
produces divergent attitudes on integration, education, or religious denomination
in the respective administrative districts. However, in one area, all cantons share the
same stance. In the referendum held on November 29, 2009, 57 percent of those
who voted supported the ban on the construction of minarets, thus expressing their
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7 Articles 1 and 15 of the Law of September 29, 1952, stipulate that naturalization can be applied for
by an individual who has spent at least 12 years in Switzerland, including 3 years of the 5-year period
preceding the submission of application. Swiss legislation does not provide for the possibility of
obtaining citizenship on the basis of the jus soli principle. One kind of rights directly associated with
nationality is political rights; some cantons allow foreigners to vote in local elections, but political rights
are still perceived as inseparably connected to Swiss citizenship.
attitude toward the so-called “Islamization” of the country, a specter often raised
by the Swiss People’s Party (Rzeczpospolita 2009; BBC News  2009).
Until recently, Spain had a liberal immigration policy, but with no concrete
integration mechanisms. This resulted from the country’s haste to import the much-
needed work force (especially low-skilled and under-qualified workers) on the one
hand, and from traditionally being a country of emigration. Later, during the time of
economic boom and the resulting inflow of foreign workers, periodic regulation of im -
migrant streams proved insufficient as a temporary remedy for the new problems.
Therefore, following the example of the United States, the Spanish authorities de -
cided to legalize the stay of illegal immigrants who had lived in Spain for many years.
The 2005 amnesty revealed the real scale of “illegal” immi gration and also put a stop
to new waves by creating an efficient administrative and con trol apparatus (Arango
and Jachimowicz 2005). In consequence, a set of only partially cohesive regulations
was developed, which has three weaknes ses: ineffecti ve ness in counteracting growing
spatial segregation; uneven territorial distribution of immigrants, resulting in a dense
population of foreigners only in certain regions of the country; and the resultant addi -
tional burden on the pro vinces and communes.
The Italian case turned out to be slightly different from the Iberian one. In
the first decade of the twenty-first century, Italy oscillated between two poles: the
liberal one, manifested in the 2002 adoption of an amnesty for illegal immigrants,
and the extremely restrictive one, legalized in the Act of July 2009. While the
amnesty for illegal immigrants did not raise doubts or objections throughout Euro pe,
the introduction of the restrictive law has. European public opinion was shaken
by the fact that Italian legislators and politicians decided to pass an amendment
according to which illegal stay in Italy is recognized as a criminal act and not, as
it used to be, an administrative offence. Additionally, a foreigner in detention who
has no residence permit is fined €10 000, and a person who intentionally shelters an
illegal immigrant runs the risk of up to three years imprisonment (Morris 2009). Such
a drastic law has raised objections from institutions dealing with human rights pro-
tection, as well as other entities concerned with the nature of the newly intro-
duced regulations, which —like it or not— resemble those from the times of the
Mussolini dictatorship. Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Eu -
ro pe Thomas Hammarberg believes that the case of Italy directly points to an urgent
need for developing a joint migration policy —particularly one on immigration—
in Europe to eliminate the potential for creating legislation and regulations vio-
lating human dignity in the future (Hammarberg 2009; Lewis 2009).
In the era of increasingly intensive globalization and fast, cheap communica-
tion, leading to relatively easy movement and travel, the flow of immigrants entails
growth in cultural diversity. The phenomenon is sometimes interpreted as a threat,
all the more so because the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, or London con-
tribute to the catastrophic vision of the effects of such an encounter of different
cultures and the alleged “clash of civilizations.” Fear of terrorism, associated with cul -
tural and religious otherness, is intensified even more by the competition of groups
and individuals for the access to real and symbolic capital.
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To sum up, one is bound to recognize that the strong critique of the current
“working models of integration” is fully justified. Criticism itself does not solve the
problem, though, which is taking on more and more advanced forms, requiring
urgent and efficient solutions. 
Immigrants in the Nordic Countries: 
The Cases of Denmark, Sweden and Finland
Integration policy models cannot be constructed without reference to the struc-
ture of the immigrant community. Apart from the demographics, profession, and
competencies categories, their legal status needs to be taken into account (legality or
illegality of stay), as well as the equally important way a given country defines cit-
izenship. What should be mentioned here are two chief principles of including an
individual in a civic community, i.e., two principles used to determine the condi-
tions for an individual becoming a citizen of a given country. These are the so-
called right of blood (ius sanguinis) and right of soil (ius soli).
Taking all this into account, let us take a look at the modern integration mod-
els in the three Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  
DENMARK
Due to its geographic location between Scandinavia and continental Europe, Den -
mark has been a natural place of transit, first for the trade of goods, and later for mi -
 gration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, due to the dynamically de -
 v eloping agriculture and food-processing industry, the country became a very attrac tive
destination for the foreign work force in search of employment. The Danish market also
continued to be highly receptive at the beginning of the following century (Olszewski
2008, 17). Thus, the phenomena of emigration and immigration were by no means
alien to Denmark, which led to the development of a certain migratory tra di tion.
Initially, it involved the neighboring countries (Sweden, Germany, the Nether lands,
Great Britain), whose societies were culturally similar and whose eco nomies were
comparably developed. Emigrant and immigrant movement balanced out, and for
a long time the number of Danish inhabitants remained virtually unchanged. 
Different changes in the origin of immigration and the number of immigrants
occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. The size of the new immigrant
groups, consisting mainly of Turks, Pakistanis, and citizens of the former Yugos lavia,
upset the former balance of emigration and immigration, in favor of the latter. 
In 2007, immigrants constituted 8.7 percent of the Danish population, slightly
over 454 000, far more than two decades earlier, when in 1984 they made up only 2
percent of Danish society.8
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By adopting the 1999 Integration Act, Denmark became the first state in Eu -
ro pe to approach the key issue of immigration and the resultant consequences in a
regulated and comprehensive manner. Danish legislators intended to create opti-
mum conditions for the newcomers so they could be swiftly and effectively included
in the social mainstream and at the same time guarantee their rights to education
and professional and personal development.  
Since then, the law has stipulated that the first step in the integration process is
to facilitate the immigrant’s contact with the Danish language, tradition, history, and
reality. Immigrants enjoy the right to a three-year, free-of-charge course in Danish.
Apart from that, they can take courses on Danish culture, politics, and economy. Re -
gional and local government authorities, on the other hand, are res pon sible for the
appropriate verification of the immigrants’ professional competencies, to be able
to offer them proper on-the-job or vocational courses. These activities are super-
vised by the Ministry for Integration. 
In 2005, the government submitted an integration plan called “A New Chance
for Everyone” to the parliament. The plan passed by majority vote and was approved
for implementation. Key elements of the program include increasing immigrant
employment, raising qualifications through education and training, and enhancing
the involvement of authorities and local units in the integration pro cess. These pre m -
ises are translated into concrete actions targeting different segments of the immigrant
community: women, children, youth, the elderly, etc. 
Elements of integration policy were included in the 2007 government plan,
determining the social development objectives for the years to come. The plan is
entitled “Society of Opportunities. New Goals” and provides for the construction
of an integrated society on the basis of far-reaching cooperation on all levels (local,
regional, and national) involving numerous entities, both state and private (Stats -
ministeriet 2007). The main emphasis was placed on the activation of immigrant
circles, especially in the field of the so-called ethnic businesses, and on the par-
ticipation of women in society. 
An important element in integrating all members of society is informal edu-
cation, which consists of different parallel processes such as passing on knowledge
and cultivating tolerance and understanding of different cultures. At the same time,
even the slightest manifestations of discrimination or hostility toward people of
different ethnic, racial, or national origin as well as different sexual orientation or re -
ligion must be eliminated. 
As mentioned above, integration actions involve not only state, but also pri-
vate entities. The idea is to distribute the integration effort among many partici-
pants, both on the side of the receiving country as well as the incoming individu-
als/groups. An example of such an approach is the “All Young People Needed”
size of the Muslim population was 120 000 in 1999. Curiously enough, no detailed calculations have
been performed so far to determine the number of immigrants in this category. Researchers estimate
that in 2006, the Danish Muslim community totalled around 210 000 (Ministry of Refugee, Immi -
gration, and Integration Affairs 2006).
campaign, proposing to the youth of non-Danish descent that they co-found local
cultural and educational centers in their neighborhoods. Five years after the adop-
tion of the Integration Act, the following facts speak to the effectiveness of inte-
gration actions:
• increased number of employed immigrants,
• higher employment rate of immigrants by private employers, 
• greater satisfaction of Danish entrepreneurs with the work done by immi-
grants (76 percent of private employers and 79 percent of state employers), and
• increased percentage of young people of non-Danish descent who contin-
ue their studies in secondary schools (Statistics Denmark n. d.).
A survey carried out by Catinét Research provided additional information
confirming positive changes on the path toward greater social integration: in 2001,
39 percent of immigrants had Danish friends and acquaintances, while four years
later this rose to more than 50 percent with native Danes in the circle of their
closest friends.
SWEDEN
Sweden, experiencing intensive migratory movements since the second half of the
twentieth century, and consequently a more and more conspicuous presence of
culturally, ethnically, religiously, or racially different minority groups in its territory,
tried to develop a model of social, political, and economic relations that would gua r -
antee every person full participation in the country’s communal life. This did not
happen right away, and as the analysis of the current situation reveals, the objective
of full inclusion of immigrants in the social mainstream has not yet been achieved,
even though Sweden is perceived as a role model for good integration practices.9
Modern Swedish society, as a result of past and current migratory flows, has become
a mul ticultural, multiethnic society, where one-fifth of its nearly 10 million inhab-
itants is made up of immigrants and their children.
In the Swedish discourse on migrations and their effects, threads drawing on the
native Swedish experience of immigration in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury are intertwined with the ones going back to a much earlier experience in the
final three decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century. That period witnessed Swedish emigration to the United States, Canada,
Brazil, Argentina, Australia, or New Zealand. “Migratory experience,” made up of sev-
eral generations’ individual and collective experiences, is an important factor that
determines the modern outlook on the phenomenon.
An ideological change in the way the relationship between the majority soci-
ety and the minorities was shaped in Sweden occurred in the late 1960s. At that
time, a new concept emerged, consisting of the construction of social relations on
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the basis of three fundamental principles: respect for difference/otherness (racial,
ethnic, religious, or cultural), equal treatment of every individual on the labor market,
and immigrants’ right to a free-of-charge course in Swedish. The emerging foun-
dations of “immigrant policy” (invandrarpolitiken), inspired by the Canadian pol-
icy of multiculturalism, provided for:
1) equality: first and foremost, equal treatment of every individual in the
labor market;
2) freedom: the possibility of choosing between practicing native customs
and adapting to Swedish culture;
3) cooperation: state endorsement of immigrant initiatives, especially activities
by ethnic organizations acting as parties in the dialogue between the majori-
ty society and the minorities.
A further element within the framework of immigrant policy is refugee poli-
cy (flyktingspolitiken), in place since the 1970s. With time, it has taken on a separate,
more independent status. 
The early 1990s brought turbulence in Swedish social, political, and econo mic
life. The country was struck by the economic crisis involving most of the dev eloped
countries in the world, as well as mass emigration from the Balkans. Growing
unemployment, reaching 8.2 percent in 1993, affected immigrants first, and they
became the direct victims of the crisis.10 In the new situation, Sweden was forced
to tighten immigration regulations, all the more so because parties that built their
potential draw on social bitterness and resentment toward the social and economic
policy then in place gained popularity and came to the fore. The crowning argu-
ment of the extremely conservative parties, including the thriving right-wing New
Democracy, was the need to protect the Swedish market, the Swedish economy, and,
first and foremost, to protect Sweden against the inflow of individuals and groups
representing different, and consequently, incongruent cultural patterns. It was a
popular belief that immigrants were a group of people who ignored the Swedish
social and cultural reality, were unwilling to study the Swedish language, and took
advantage of the extensive social benefits offered by the welfare state.
What happened in Sweden, a prosperous country at the time, was neither
unusual nor strange. Any crisis, particularly one involving the economy, generates
resentment and a tendency to search for a simple justification of an unacceptable
situation. In such cases, one usually finds explanations in arguments that are not
rational, but appeal to human emotions. This is exactly what happened when the
attitude of Swedish authorities about the exodus from the Balkans and the con-
tinued admittance of refugees was highly criticized by the opposition, supported
by an ever-growing portion of Swedish society. That was when discriminatory or
racist speeches and acts were being witnessed more frequently than ever. Preju -
10 Interestingly enough, in 2009, unemployment reached a similar level: 8.3 percent. See Dagens
Nyheter (2010).
dice against foreign minority groups was no longer hidden, but more and more
boldly demonstrated in the form of aggressive speeches or incidents. The tense
domestic situation called for a swift reaction, which consisted of a change in pre-
vious premises for immigrant and refugee policies. It was understood that previ-
ous practice led to the development of “closed,” passive attitudes among immi-
grants, who were allowed to choose between their native culture and the Swedish
one. Paradoxically, the freedom of choice led to the creation of ethnic enclaves,
cultural islands of sorts, existing next to each other, but never together. The slow,
gradual separation of immigrants from the rest of the society did not help shape
mutual relations, but made social dialogue, already weakened by the unfavorable
economic situation, even more difficult.
Toward the end of the 1990s, a new concept of the organization and man-
agement of the Swedish multicultural society appeared. It received the “promising”
name of integration policy (integrationspolitiken). According to its principles, the
parties were granted the same rights, opportunities, and, first and foremost, obli-
gations; this had never been as firmly emphasized before. Thus, integration, and
not coexistence, became the determinant factor and the goal of Swedish domes-
tic policy. The principle is still followed today, even though it is continually mod-
ified based on the dictates of everyday practice and necessity.  
FINLAND
After World War II, Finland remained an emigrant country for a long time. Waves
of Finnish emigrants poured into neighboring Sweden, but also into Norway and
Denmark. A considerable percentage of emigrants chose the United States as their
destination. It was only in the final two decades of the twentieth century that the
emigrant flow subsided. The 1980s were characterized by an accelerated growth
of the Finnish economy, which switched to the production of high technologies and
filled the Finnish Diaspora with new hope for a return home. The country’s improved
financial conditions soon turned out to be good enough to start building prosperity.
This is indeed what happened. What was significant for the efforts undertaken at
the time was Finnish cooperation within the framework of the Nordic agreement,
involving the economic, political, and cultural spheres. 
Starting from the early 1990s, repatriation of the people of Finnish descent
from the territories of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) began.
This group did not integrate easily, as its members spoke no Finnish and did not
feel a particularly strong bond with the country of their ancestors (Tanner 2004).
At the same time groups of people seeking refugee status started flowing into Fin -
land, as well as individuals in search of a new homeland, often for purely economic
reasons. In early 2009, Finland’s population included nearly 156 000 foreigners,
a little over 3 percent of the total (Statistikcentralen 2009).
In 1997, Eduskunda, the Finnish parliament, passed a law about the princi-
ples of immigration and integration policy. According to its guidelines, integration
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consists of active participation of immigrants in social, economic, and political life.
The principle of equal status is characteristic of this participation. What is also sig-
nificant is that the state ensures that immigrant groups can cultivate their traditions
and customs as long as they do not contradict the Finnish Constitution.  
According to the Finnish integration concept, foreigners are perceived as
partners actively involved in the process of the construction of Finnish reality.
Finland does not follow the ius soli principle when granting citizenship. Newcomers
are allowed to apply for Finnish citizenship after a five-year legal stay in the coun-
try. Applicants need to meet several requirements: they have to speak fluent Finnish
(an additional asset is good command of Swedish), have no criminal record, and
have a regular, steady income (Kyntäjä 2003, 187).
Since Finland is undoubtedly a prosperous country, foreigners with perma-
nent residency can enjoy extensive welfare benefits. Unemployed immigrants are
invited to participate in special, individual integration programs from which they
receive a government integration allowance whose use is monitored by an employ-
ment office worker. The solution is aimed at the best possible and most effective
use of financial resources, coupled simultaneously with the development of the
interested party’s professional potential. 
The Ombudsman for Foreigners, established in 1998, supports the imple-
mentation of integration policy. The Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO)
is an advisory body to the government institutions dealing with migration and
integration that dates from the same year. The 14 board members were directly
appointed by both the native and the ethnic minority groups, a practical manifes-
tation of immigrants’ real involvement in the decision-making process about inte-
gration (Kyntäjä 2003, 205).11
Like Sweden, Finland has become a typical immigration country over the last
10 years. Facing the issue of the growing inflow of foreigners, the Finnish govern -
ment determined (with the approval of the parliament) annual quotas of between
500 and 1 000 for the number of immigrants allowed into the country as refugees
(Kyntäjä 2003, 193). These people are entitled to language courses and vocational
training. Additionally, in order to facilitate quick integration, they are sent to diffe -
rent parts of the country to prevent the creation of ethnic clusters (Kyntäjä 2003,
198). Thanks to agreements signed with different state institutions, local district
and municipal authorities can offer accommodation to immigrants and reimburse
the maintenance cost from public coffers.
As far as educational programs for immigrant children and teenagers are con-
cerned, day care and education centers, where children can learn Finnish as well
as their native language free of charge, are highly popular. According to integra-
tion policy principles, children can study their native language three to four hours
a week free of charge. Adults can also participate in similar courses, tailor-made for
their needs. Apart from the aforementioned forms of assistance, the Finnish state
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offers financial support to institutions founded by immigrants, sponsors television
and radio programs broadcast in native languages, and earmarks funds for ethnic
press publications. 
Problems with adaptation and integration occur in different spheres of com-
munal and private life. However, in Finland the greatest problem for immigrants
is their continued high unemployment rate, which is much higher than that of the
native population, coming to nearly 30 percent, compared to 7 percent for the rest of so -
ciety. Lack of work and frequent use of welfare benefits constitutes a direct cause of
foreigners’ marginalization and partial exclusion. For those very reasons, general opi n -
ion about immigrants is not particularly positive. This negative attitude is addi tio nally
strengthened by the events in neighboring Sweden and Denmark, as well as by the
general tendencies to radicalize attitudes about immigrants in continental Europe.  
Rhetoric Predicting Changes: Denmark
Widely discussed in Europe, the need to change migration policy is also subject to
debate in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, we can
see a dramatic change of rhetoric in the discourse on migration and its consequen -
ces. The last decade has seen the rise of great social resentment not only in terms
of the general economic condition caused by the global financial crisis since 2007,
but also disappointment in previous integration policies for immigrants, policies that
apparently have not achieved the intended results. 
In European countries with a large proportion of immigrants like France, the
United Kingdom, Italy, or Spain, integration policies seem to be relatively inef-
fective compared to their financial and social costs. This naturally undermines
citizens’ confidence in political parties, politicians, and intellectuals who opt for
immigration as a means to rescue aging societies.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement in the German parliament in
October 2010 about the failure of the German policy of multiculturalism received
wide media coverage in Europe. For some in the audience, the statement was
shocking, but for others it was not and merely reflected the true state of affairs.
Merkel’s conclusion, adopted by the media and extended later to European migra-
tion policy in general, has modified the public discourse, giving it a much more
critical tone. Since then it has become much easier to question the policy of mul-
ticulturalism, and to challenge the presence of immigrants, especially those from
outside the EU.
Anti-immigrant rhetoric typical of extreme right-wing circles also began to
appear gradually in the statements of politicians from liberal circles. The case of
Denmark constitutes such an example.
The recovery plan for the Danish economy after the 2007 financial upheaval,
presented on May 25, 2010, by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, contains
several major changes. One concerns toughening the procedures for legalizing the
stay on Danish soil for non-EU citizens. Another significant change boils down to
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modifying —by restricting more— access to the system of social services for
immigrants already residing in the country.
According to the authors of the recovery plan and the prime minister himself,
the proposed changes are dictated by the need to repair state finances, as well as
by the obligation (as an EU member-state) of reducing the budget deficit from five
percent to three percent of GDP. 
The planned savings are to be ensured by the following cuts in public expen-
ditures:
• shortening the period for receiving unemployment benefits from four to
two years;
• reducing child allowances to 30 000 crowns (This is supposed to save 1 bil-
lion crowns in 2013.);
• keeping financial support for developing countries at the same level as in
previous years (This will save nearly 1.4 billion crowns.); and
• reducing subsidies for translators in hospitals (This will create a savings of
15 million crowns). (Lehmann 2010)
Critics of the plan and the reform say the government is going after simple
solutions using populist arguments and applying methods that might affect the
most vulnerable, including immigrants.
Some experts, observers of the Danish domestic political scene, believe that
before being put into practice, the government initiatives must first gain the “silent”
support of the populist party Dansk Folkeparti (DF). The party has been growing
in power since the late 1990s and now constitutes a significant political force in the
Danish parliament. The proposed toughening up of migration policy and re duc tion of
social benefits are changes very welcomed by the DF.
Michael Bach Henriksen, a journalist at the Kristeligt Dagblad newspaper,
stated that the savings proposed in the reform program could be called into ques-
tion and are very small taking into account all the country’s finances. According to
Henriksen, this indicates three tendencies: first, ruling politicians do not have the
courage to look for savings in areas where they really should (e.g., by limiting the
possibility of early retirement); second, the DF’s impact on the government is dis-
turbingly hefty; third, the government is looking for temporary solutions, under-
taking rather symbolic and irrelevant actions (2010).
In addition to all of the above, the reduction of allowances for families with
more than three children strikes directly at immigrant families, which are traditio n -
ally large. This is an open warning signal to immigrants that family policy in Denmark
is being toughened.
Helle Ib expressed similar comments in the Berlingske Tidende newspaper. The
journalist stated that the government bowed to DF influence, deciding to repair
the state budget at the expense of immigrants and their descendants (2010).
A contrary point of view is presented by DF leaders Pia Kjærsgaard, Kristian
Dahl Thulesen, and Peter Skaarup. They believe that the reform does nothing more
ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS, ACTIONS, AND POLICIES 417
than divide the cost of the Danish welfare state among all its residents, including
immigrants and their descendents. The immigrants should not be treated more
favorably than native Danes (Lehmann 2010). 
A controversy arose after Peter Skaarup’s statement that if non-European immi -
grants worked as much as native Danes, the state would be able to save nearly 24 bi l -
lion crowns (Skaarup 2010). This is one of the examples and at the same time an
indicator of the direction the public discourse on immigration may develop.
Suggestions that immigrants are prone to misuse the Danish welfare system
and that they avoid work fall on fertile ground. Populist arguments about the re -
luctance of immigrants to integrate into Danish society, immigrants’ inclination to
lock themselves in ethnic ghettos, and their tendency to crime constitute very dan -
gerous and powerful rhetoric creating a metaphoric picture of immigrants as a group
of people unwilling to integrate and willing to separate and live on the ex pense of
the rest of society. 
The recovery program for the Danish economy has become a convenient mo -
ment for the DF to push through the modification of Danish (im)migration policy.
Thus, in the new concept of the policy the immigrants are obliged to be ready to
accept work quickly after arrival in the host country, undertake professional train-
ing courses, and learn the Danish language. Failure to fulfill these requirements
would constitute grounds for expelling an immigrant from the country. 
Denmark’s political landscape has significantly changed during the past two
decades. So has the public discourse on immigration. The contemporary discourse
around the policy applied to immigrants in Denmark contains much more severe
criticism than several years ago. It is powered by such events as the Islamist’s reac -
tion to the Muhammad cartoons published by Jyllands Posten in 2005 and the for-
tunately unsuccessful attempt to murder cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, their author.
The present alignment of forces in the government coalition and the parlia-
ment reflects the mood of the Danish voters, who do not deny the need to reduce
the influx of immigrants to their country and to tighten the rules governing their stay.
For some political commentators, what is happening in Denmark is rather an
unnecessary and embarrassing episode in the country’s modern history; others un -
derstand it as an indispensable element in the process of governing a country like
Denmark, with a tradition of democracy, freedom of speech, and a secular state.
The End of Political Correctness? Sweden
For several years, the Swedish discourse on the financial and social condition of
the country has included increasing calls for an open, constructive, public debate
about (im)migration policy. A need for such a discussion based on solid arguments
has been evident for several reasons. These include the lack of transparent pro-
cedures for the admission of immigrants (including refugees); incomplete data
about the financial costs involved in this process; and imprecisely stated amounts
of the tax revenues paid by immigrants into state coffers.
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An analysis of the discourse in the Swedish media over the past few years in -
dicates that public opinion demands the revision of current immigration policy.
There appears to be a great deal of concern about the safety of public finances.
Questions are raised, among others, about the allocation methods for budgetary
resources dedicated to social services. The generosity of the social system prac-
ticed for many decades had few opponents, who argued the grave consequences of
such a policy. The voices of these skeptics, however, were not loud, and they re -
mained outside the mainstream rhetoric, which accepted the current practice.
For almost four decades, generously supported disadvantaged groups had de -
veloped an attitude, a tendency to excessive use of allowances and benefits. This
appealed to immigrants, but also to native Swedes.
The information policy of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, seen from today’s per -
s pective, contributed to creating the image of immigrants as individuals who needed
protection and special state aid, because they came mostly from developing coun-
tries. Opinion leaders set an example by showing commitment to the immigrants’
issues. This commendable attitude has become the norm, but, to some extent, it has
also “disabled” the immigrant population, by indicating that it was more profitable
to be dependent than to be independent and resourceful.
The question arises about the origin or source of such a generous social pol-
icy. One of the answers may be that, while becoming a welfare state in the 1950s
and 1960s, Sweden wanted to change its own image, which had accompanied the
country before and during World War II. Declaring itself neutral in the conflict,
Sweden could afford economic agreements with each of the warring parties, thus
sparking severe controversies worldwide.
Returning to the present, the criticism of current migration policy raised by some
media is due to the fact that, according to the United Nations definition, 8 out of
10 asylum seekers are in fact not refugees (Sandelin 2008).
The variety of terms and a multiplicity of denominations present in the Swedish
language contribute to clerical errors in the proper recognition of immigrants’ status.
The multiplicity and variety of terms similar in meaning seems to be a factor con-
tributing to deficiencies in the management of migration flows.
The costs of the current migration policy are not exactly known; they remain
estimates. This provides another reason to speculate about the actual amount. The
daily press publishes different numbers ranging from 40 billion to 300 billion crowns
a year. The large spread between the quoted sums is caused by the changing in -
tensity of immigration flows in a particular year and in the preceding years.
This is all aggravated by the fact that the results of research conducted for
the state institutions responsible for integration show that, after five years’ residence
in Sweden, half the men who came as refugees in 2003 continued without a job!
When it comes to women, it was even worse: 60 to 70 percent, depending on the
ethnic group (Sandelin 2008).
The lack of an open critical review of (im)migration policy resulted from sev-
eral factors: 1) a belief in this policy’s efficacy; 2) a deep-rooted conviction about
the  righteousness of helping disadvantaged individuals by granting asylum; and
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3) political correctness. The last of these factors meant that migration issues were
not a subject of public debate, but rather stayed behind ministry doors. No one
taking part in the public discourse on immigration wanted to be accused of “hid-
den hostility toward immigrants” or “hidden racism.”
Ideologically tinged rhetoric used hitherto in public debate distorted the dis-
course about immigration, making it artificial, unreal, distanced from reality, in the
name of solidarity and empathy for the less privileged. As it turns out, one of the major
challenges for today’s migration policy in Sweden is to modify the socio-political
discourse on immigration both in its form as well as its content.
A New Balance of Power in the Parliament: 
Finland 
A need for change in immigration policy is also evident in Finland. Until the 2007
crisis, debate over immigration and immigrants was not a central theme in Finnish
public discourse. It was carried out almost on the margins, using rather mild rhet-
oric. However, today the situation has changed. The economic downturn reduced
the sense of financial stability among ordinary citizens, who began to launch neg-
ative comments about the issue of open borders. Slogans demanding tighter immi -
gration laws are not exceptional or unusual today. They can be heard on the streets,
read on Internet portals, or even seen in some media. 
A dramatic increase of these negative emotions can be observed since 2008,
when the elections for municipal councils took place. The pre-election struggle was
fierce, full of sharp arguments, sometimes even aggressive. Astrid Thors, Finnish
Mi nister of Migration for European Affairs, experienced the resentments per-
sonally. One of the members of the populist party Sannfinländarna (“True Finns”)
published on Facebook a statement expressing his readiness to accept the penalty
and consequences for killing the minister. These threats were immediately spot-
ted by police and prosecutors, who began an investigation. The swift response of law
enfor ce ment agencies, however, did not discourage other party supporters from
uploading further aggressive statements onto the Internet (Kaarto 2010).
The Internet has turned out to be an effective communication platform for
disseminating contents impossible to publish elsewhere. Some groups, associations,
or other politically oriented formations, reluctant about or opposed to immigrants,
take advantage of this. The anti-immigration groups and associations that are active
on the Internet are also rather well organized. They have their own forums, stay in
regular contact with each other, and jointly take actions directed against their oppo -
nents. Examples can be found among harassment cases in which jour na lists and poli -
ticians who support liberal immigration policy have received anonymous letters,
often containing threats (Helsingin Sanomat 2010a).
The anti-immigrant movement still remains on the margins of social movements;
however, it is growing stronger and expanding its influence. One of the symptoms
of this trend is the result of a Gallup survey conducted for Finland’s largest daily
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Helsingin Sanomat in March 2010. According to the survey, 60 percent of those
interviewed were against continuing the current immigration policy, and support-
ed proposals for its tightening (Helsingin Sanomat 2010b).
Public opinion in Finland exerts a strong and clear influence on the shape of
the country’s domestic policy. The voice of Finnish society contributed to the mo d -
ification of the asylum law in 2010, making it more restrictive in cases of family
reunification when individuals granted Finnish asylum want to bring family mem-
bers from abroad.
Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb openly supports immi-
gration. In an interview given to the daily Helsingin Sanomat in March 2010, he
stated that the ongoing anti-immigrant debate was not acceptable and that it con-
tradicted the overall interests of the state. His opinion is shared by Minister of Mi -
gration for European Affairs Astrid Thors, who, at a parliamentary meeting in
May 2010, presented statistical evidence of de facto decreasing inflow of immi-
grants to Finland.
In light of this fact, the public’s increasingly critical attitude toward foreigners
may be problematic and confusing, especially when immigrants constitute only
about 2.5 percent of Finnish society, much less than in the case of neighboring
Sweden and Norway. 
Historically, anti-immigration attitudes seem to have a long tradition, dating
back to the mid-twentieth century. At that time, anti-immigration slogans were often
expressed by the Finnish Rural Party (Finlands Landsbygds Parti), which hit its
peak in the 1960s and 1970s. The party’s prominent leader, Veikko Vennamo, was
a charismatic, talented orator and strategist who created a significant audience of
listeners and supporters.
Although Vennamo’s party dissolved in 1995, his ideas survived and found
followers. One of them is Timo Soini, the leader of today’s populist party, the True
Finns (Sannfinländarna), which won seats in parliament in 2003.
The party’s increasing popularity is due to several factors. Among them are its
leader’s oratorical skills. Soini is an outspoken critic of the EU and its financial in -
 s titutions, which makes him popular among EU skeptics. The crisis of the Greek eco n -
omy, which seriously disturbed the euro zone, has provided Soini with additional
arguments against the EU, and also indirectly against the immigration policy pursued
by Finland as an EU member.
The growing strength of the populist party should be viewed particularly in
the wider context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in April 2011.12 Today’s
government coalition made up of four parties, including the strongest one, the Center
Party, with 51 seats in parliament, is challenged by a similar number of opposition
parties. The biggest of these, the Social Democrats, has 45 parliamentary man-
dates. It seems that subtle internal frictions within the Center Party may become
an important factor in the possible shift of power after the elections. These fric-
12 A majority of voters cast their ballots for the conservative/liberal National Coalition Party in those
elections.
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tions indicate absence of a commonly shared and united vision of the future of
Finland. Consequently, the balance of power in the Finnish parliament can and
probably will significantly change after the elections in April.
One may hope that the victorious party, in a position to build a government
coalition after the elections, will not do so by turning to the True Finns as a pos-
sible partner.
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